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Mapping the cybersecurity  
institutional landscape  
 
 
Purpose: There is growing contestation between states and private actors over cybersecurity 
responsibilities, and its governance is ever more susceptible to nationalization. We believe these 
developments are based on an incomplete picture of how cybersecurity is actually governed in practice 
and theory. Given this disconnect, this paper attempts to provide a detailed view of the cybersecurity 
institutional landscape.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: Drawing from institutional economics and using extensive desk 
research, we develop a conceptual model and broadly sketch the activities and contributions of market, 
networked and hierarchical governance structures and analyze how they interact to govern 
cybersecurity.  
Findings: Analysis shows a robust market and networked governance structures and a more limited role 
for hierarchical structures. Ex ante efforts to produce cybersecurity using purely hierarchical governance 
structures, even buttressed with support from networked governance structures, struggle without 
market demand like in the case of secure Internet identifiers. To the contrary, ex post efforts like botnet 
mitigation, route monitoring and other activities involving information sharing seem to work under a 
variety of combinations of governance structures. 
Originality/value: Our conceptualization and observations offer a useful starting point for explaining 
how cybersecurity is governed. Ultimately, this work can contribute to subsequent efforts to better 
understand how governance structures are related to variation in observed levels of cybersecurity.  
 
1. Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to provide a detailed view of the cybersecurity institutional landscape. 
Cybersecurity combines “public good” characteristics often associated with governmental 
responsibilities with a wide variety of private market goods and services, while also involving networked 
forms of organization that involve non-market, non-governmental resource and information sharing. We 
attempt to bring all three together into a synthetic overview of cybersecurity governance. We broadly 
sketch the activities and contributions each type of actor (e.g., internal activities, outsourcing, 
regulations and cooperation) to cybersecurity structures, and identify how markets, networks and 
hierarchies are related.  
 
The authors believe that a more detailed institutional mapping of cybersecurity arrangements is 
especially important now, as there is growing contestation between states and private actors over 
cybersecurity responsibilities. Cybersecurity governance is ever more susceptible to nationalization, or 









































nationalized cybersecurity in Internet governance are: the assertion of states’ sovereignty in cyberspace 
(e.g., Lewis, 2010), the linkage between many aspects of cybersecurity to national security (e.g., NIST, 
2014), and the separation of Internet governance discussions from cybersecurity discussions (see 
Mueller, in this issue). 
 
Some allege that there “is a growing consensus that nations bear increasing responsibility for enhancing 
cybersecurity” (Shackelford and Kastelic, 2014). But what exactly is this consensus based upon and what 
should these responsibilities entail? Many existing arguments making the claim for a greater state role 
are simply prefaced by the existence of insecurities, e.g, the latest vulnerability and the potential scale 
of actors impacted by it (see e.g., Lewis, 2014). In their view, this is reason enough for government 
action. Far less attention is paid to the scope and scale of cybersecurity governance across the private 
sector. Admittedly, multiple factors influence what actions governments take concerning cybersecurity. 
But a careful assessment of how cybersecurity is being governed provides a good starting basis for 
making those decisions. This paper seeks to address that shortcoming. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section two reviews the relevant literature on cybersecurity governance. 
Section three provides some analytical underpinnings of cybersecurity governance based on New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) and the concept of governance structures. In section four, we present data 
on markets, networks and hierarchies collected from multiple sources, and section five applies our 
conceptualization to the data in analyzing three cybersecurity cases. We conclude with some 
preliminary observations about forms of cybersecurity governance and opportunities for future 
research. 
2. Literature review 
More than a decade of work exists examining economic incentives in cybersecurity (Anderson 
and Moore, 2006). More recent work focuses also on its behavioral aspects (Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012). 
However, the literature on cybersecurity institutions is still in its infancy. Much work has focused on 
specific cybersecurity incidents (Healey, ed., 2013), politically motivated cyberattacks (Shakarian et al. 
2013) and policy issues related to cybersecurity (Goodman et al. 2008; Harknett and Stever 2011; 
National Research Council, 2014). Early work examining the cybersecurity institutional landscape was 
descriptive, identifying international/regional governmental, public-private and non-governmental 
organizations active in cybersecurity. (Portnoy & Goodman, 2008) More recently, Testart Pacheco 
(2016) systematically analyzed attendance at the Internet Governance Forum to “identify areas of 
competing and overlapping [organizational] interest, relevant areas out of scope of current 
[organizations] and dysfunctionalities that hinder overall security improvement.” 
 
Some studies begin to unpack the institutional landscape from a theoretical perspective. Nye (2014) 
uses regime theory (Krasner, 1982) to examine the normative structure of cyberspace. Applying the 
concept of regime complexes including formal, informal and hierarchical institutions, he concludes that 









































overarching governance regime for cyberspace will emerge (pg. 13). Choucri et al. (2014) look 
specifically at cybersecurity from an institutional perspective, and identify a number of formal 
organizations within the cybersecurity landscape based on whether the organizations have a mandate 
from international or national bodies. This narrow focus leads to a similar conclusion that the 
institutional landscape of cybersecurity is more of a patchwork of efforts rather than an overarching 
landscape that addresses all the known cyberthreats (Choucri et al. p 34). Shackelford (2014) uses 
Ostrom’s (2010) concept of polycentric governance to describe how cybersecurity is regulated. 
 
The literature highlights the important role of norms in cybersecurity governance. While cyber norms 
are considered as the basic building block for cybersecurity (Farrell, 2015), the discussions and studies, 
with the exception of Craig et al. 2015, are mostly focussed on norms without considering how and 
where these norms are being or can be effectuated. Despite the role of private organizations in 
cybersecurity, the discussions about cybernorms mainly look at United Nations initiatives (e.g., Maurer, 
2011). For example, one major discussion about cyber norms took place in the United Nations Group of 
Governmental Experts (UNGGE)1 in 2015, and another took place in 2017. Following the 2017 UNGGE, 
the United States Government (USG) issued a statement expressing dissatisfaction with the meeting 
outcome as it does not substantiate which, or how, certain international laws apply to the State’s ICT 
activities2 which ultimately  does not operationalize  the outcome of UNGGE. But norms are not always 
created and enforced by states; private institutions in cybersecurity can create and enforce such norms 
(Grady and Parisi, eds 2005, p 143). There are also regional efforts for establishing States’ cooperation 
on cybesecurity. In 2016, the members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) agreed to voluntarily cooperate on various cybersecurity activities such as information sharing 
and reporting vulnerabilities.3 Recently, Microsoft proposed a Digital Geneva Convention, where states 
commit to helping the private sector to combat cyberattacks, informing the private sector of 
vulnerabilities, and limiting offensive operations and development of cyber weapons. This commitment 
can set enforceable set of norms for states’ behavior in cyberspace (Smith, 2017).4 In another effort to 
bring a collective commitment to cybersecurity by the industry, Microsoft has suggested an 
international tech accord which commits the industry to a set of principles to protect customers 
globally, collaborate to defend against cyberattacks, help governments respond to attacks, coordinate to 
address vulnerability and fight the proliferation of vulnerabilities (Microsoft Policy Papers, 2017).5  
 
The literature also revolves around the role states play in the cybersecurity governance, including 
ranking governments’ cybersecurity governance efforts based on various legal, technical and capacity 
building efforts (e.g., ITU, 2015). Some scholars attribute the increasing role of states in cybersecurity 
                                               
1
 The full name of the group is “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” hereafter referred to as UNGGE. 
2
 Explanation of Position at the Conclusion of the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 
https://www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/releasesandremarks/272175.htm 
3
 OSCE Decision Number 1202, OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from The Use of 
Information and Communication Technologies available at: http://www.osce.org/pc/227281?download=true 
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governance to their intention to protect their citizens while enabling them to reap the economic benefit 
of the Internet (Nye, 2014, p 7; Choucri et al. 2014). The role of the states in cybersecurity has been 
routinely framed as a national security issue (see generally, cybersecurity work by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies). To the contrary, Cavelty (2012) warned against framing 
cybersecurity as a national security issue and argued that the role of the military in future cybersecurity 
operations will be limited and needs to be carefully defined.  
 
A growing number of studies illustrate the actual role of non-state actors (such as markets and 
networks) in cybersecurity governance. For example, cyber insurance is well studied as a market based 
solution for some cybersecurity issues (Marotta, et al. 2017). Other work has clarified the 
interdependence of actors, incentives and various structures in cybersecurity, e.g., van Eeten and Bauer 
(2013), and demonstrated that the empirical reality of cybersecurity issues are nuanced and observable 
(e.g., van Eeten, et al. 2010; Rowe and Wood, 2012; Vasek et al. 2016; Jhaveri et al. 2017). Schmidt 
(2014) analyses the role of open source and peer production elements in the response to attacks and 
botnets, showing how security communities balance their need for secrecy with their need to widely 
share information. Mueller, Schmidt & Kuerbis (2013) explore whether the Internet’s heavy reliance on 
non-hierarchical, networked forms of governance is compatible with growing concerns about cyber-
security from traditional state actors. 
3. Conceptualizing cybersecurity 
governance 
This section provides some conceptual and theoretical underpinnings for understanding how 
cybersecurity is governed. Based on the literature review above and as illustrated in Figure 1 below, we 
believe explaining cybersecurity governance must account for a variety of activities, forms of social 
organization and other important factors, represented as an institution. We argue that it is the selection 
of, and interaction between, various governance structures that creates institutions. The section 
concludes with an illustration of how different governance structures have had different outcomes in 
facilitating one cybersecurity activity, information sharing. 
 
Our work draws mainly from the New Institutional Economics (NIE), including Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). The pioneers of NIE used the term “institutional environments” (Davis and North, 
1971: 6 sq.) to refer to both societal and economic institutions (Menard, 1995, 568). In the abstract, 
institutions are sets of rules, e.g., laws, customs and norms that guide or constrain human behavior and 
possess enforcement characteristics (North, 1994). As outlined by Knight (1992, p 19), institutions have 
distributional outcomes and are used strategically by actors to constrain the actions of others with 
whom they interact. The distributional emphasis raises questions of institutional maintenance including 
stability of the outcomes achieved and efficacy of the constraints devised. (p. 19) Examples of 
institutions include the property rights system, a well-functioning capital market or secure cyberspace. It 
is important to note that there is a sharp distinction between the rules and the players (i.e., 









































focuses explanations on the overall picture rather than on a single activity or organization that may or 
may not have an effective or limited role in governing cybersecurity.  
 
As shown in Figure 1 below, at the most basic level are cybersecurity activities such as vulnerability 
identification and disclosure, malware analysis, incident response, network and software maintenance, 
monitoring and updating, risk assessment and insuring, internal policy development, hiring and training 
etc. (see Section 4 for how we developed the list of activities). These activities may be undertaken by 
individuals or organizations, both public and private. Activities may overlap to some degree. For 
instance, they can rely in part on some form of information sharing among parties, or standardization of 
data being shared, or generalized risk management approaches. For example, the aggregation and 
sharing of vulnerability information used in network monitoring purposes or incident data underlying 
risk assessment models, or the secure provision of unique identifiers supporting access to or use of a 
system. Stand-alone activities, however, do not make the cybersecurity institutional landscape. Only 
when they are undertaken within a governance structure(s) do they become part of it. 
 
Figure 1: A framework for cybersecurity activities, governance structures and institutional landscape 
 
At the next level, governance structures are embedded in the institutional landscape. Governance 
structure is a shorthand expression for “the institutional framework in which contracts are initiated, 
negotiated, monitored, adapted, enforced and terminated” (Palay, 1984). While the various governance 
structures might sometimes overlap in certain institutional frameworks, they remain distinct from one 
another6 (Ménard, 1995). Three broad categories of governance structures are commonly noted in 
institutional economics: markets, hierarchies and networks (Williamson 1985; 1996). Markets are a 
governing structure where transactions among actors are driven by information and price mechanism, 
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and enforced by law and contract. Examples include the purchase of cybersecurity consulting services, 
security software and equipment, zero-day markets, etc. Hierarchies are a governing structure by which 
actor(s) transactions are compelled by an authority, e.g., enforcement can be achieved by sovereignty 
and jurisdiction of a nation-state, by organizational control of the firm or by contractual regime. 
Examples include national laws and regulations, formal intergovernmental arrangements, organizational 
cybersecurity policies, or ICANN and Regional Internet Registry (RIR) contracts, etc. Finally, drawing from 
Scharpf (1997), Mueller, Schmidt and Kuerbis (2013) define networked governance structures as a 
"semipermanent, voluntary negotiation system… [that] allows interdependent actors to opt for 
collaboration or unilateral action in the absence of an overarching authority”. Examples include Internet 
routing coordination, anti-phishing, spam and botnet mitigation efforts, etc. 
 
Why do governance structures matter? 
Conceptually, governance structures helpfully delineates between different types of activities 
observed in the production and governance of cybersecurity. For example, in looking at early botnet 
mitigation efforts, Schmidt (2014, p 187) argues that "Networks differ from hierarchies by their different 
permeability for membership candidates, a more flat and decentralised organisational structure, low 
degree of legalisation, trust as the ultimate glue between members, a consensus-oriented decision 
making process, fast and direct flows of communication, and lower set-up costs and time." However, 
governance structures are not static, nor mutually exclusive. Schmidt and others (e.g., Radu, 2014, p 4) 
indicate that we are undergoing a process of hierarchization of networked production of security, and 
“replacement of horizontal networks by existing hierarchies.” Kuerbis and Mueller (2011) show how the 
introduction of new security technologies can similarly challenge existing governance structures.  
 
Theoretically, prior work in TCE has established that the costs associated with particular types of 
transactions depend on the governance structures within which they take place. Well-designed 
governance structures reduce transaction costs and enable parties to cooperate with each other in 
mutually beneficial ways. TCE-based theory of the firm provides a theoretically integrated explanation of 
how markets and firms (hierarchies) are interdependent and why any given industry produces a specific 
distribution of organizations along the market-hierarchy spectrum. (Mueller, Schmidt & Kuerbis, 2013) 
This is an important distinction from approaches like regime theory or polycentric governance, which 
aptly describe complex governance settings, but do not explain why we end up with one type of 
governance structure versus another. But there are also practical implications to a better understanding 
of governance structures in the cybersecurity institutional landscape. Prior work suggests the production 
of cybersecurity and related Internet activities can take various forms, as public, private, club or 
commons resource goods. For instance, some argue there is adequate private production of 
cybersecurity in certain industry sectors (e.g., Powell, 2005), yet arguments persist that there is a market 
failure and a need for government intervention around underlying activities, e.g., information sharing 
(see Kobayashi, 2005; Rosenzweig, 2011; Schneider, Sedenberg and Mulligan, 2016). A more nuanced 
understanding of the governance structures in which these activities take place can help determine the 










































An illustrative example is the activity of information sharing, which has been viewed by some as 
inadequate (Nolan 2015, p 4). There have been multiple initiatives by nation-states and 
intergovernmental bodies to stimulate or outright create information sharing either within industry 
sectors or across them. For instance, ENISA (2015) documents at least 16 national or regional-level intra-
industry or cross-industry initiatives. Legislative efforts in the European Union and the United States 
proposed different models for information sharing (Wolff 2015). Within the United States, certain USG 
contractors must report cyber incident information, while recently-passed legislation alters company 
liability and inserts the Department of Homeland Security into the facilitation of private sector-
government information sharing (the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 USC § 1501)). But 
these represent only one type of information sharing governance structure, i.e., hierarchy. Multiple 
market-based vulnerability information sharing efforts have emerged over the past decade or more 
(Kuehn and Mueller 2014; Libicki, et al. 2015), as well as networked forms. From a resource perspective, 
we see attempts to manage information in multiple ways. The advantage of an institutional perspective 
based on governance structures is that, in addition to providing more precise explanations of how 
cybersecurity activities are governed, we may find that certain structures or combinations of structures 
can ultimately help explain variation in levels of cybersecurity. 
4. Data 
 The cybersecurity institutional landscape is vast. This section represents an initial collection of 
data on markets, networks and hierarchies from multiple sources. As our research in this area continues, 
we will refine our approaches, dataset and conclusions. 
 
Markets  
To better understand the entirety of the market we took two approaches. First, we focused 
narrowly, reviewing data on market estimates and financial performance of pure cybersecurity 
companies. Second, we expanded our lense, collecting data about companies engaged in the production 
of cybersecurity activities to give additional context about geographical distribution, historical growth, 
and organizational capacity. 
 
Cybersecurity “pure plays” market estimates and performance 
Various proprietary estimates put the market for cybersecurity goods and services at around 
$120B in 2017, up from around $65B five years ago, and expected to be anywhere from $137 to 202B by 
2021.7 According to industry analysis of one cybersecurity focused exchange-traded fund (ETF), these 
companies have experienced higher sales growth over the last 3 years, on average, and invested more of 
their sales into R&D than companies in the S&P 500 Information Technology Index. (Pendse, 2016) The 
same analysis identifies foreign sales by cybersecurity companies as percent of total sales have also 















































increased about 2.5% over the past three years, indicating that demand for cybersecurity has been 
expanding globally. As Table 1 shows, growth is being driven by sector specific activity like mobile and 
software security, Internet of Things (IoT) security, and specialized threat analysis and protection, which 
are significantly smaller than overall information technology security in terms of market cap but have 
much higher compound annual growth rates. Concomitant with this growth, investment in the 
cybersecurity market grew steadily over the previous five years. CB Insights reports global funding 
activity at $1.26B in 2012, rising to $3.76B in 2015 and tapering off slightly to a projected $3.09B in 
2016.8 Looking at overall cybersecurity funding, they report 3,387 financings totaling $24.9B, with 
companies being funded as early as 1993.  
 
Table 1: Market Size and Growth (Source: Pendse, 2016) 
Area 
Market Cap ($ 
billions) 
CAGR (% from 
2015-2020) 
IT Security 35 5% 
Mobile Enterprise and Software Security 2 12% 
IoT Security Products 9 17% 
Specialized Threat Analysis and 
Protection 1.5 27% 
 
These overall growth trends of the cybersecurity market are reflected in the performance of a 
composite of cybersecurity focused ETFs.9 Since mid-2015, cybersecurity ETFs have substantially 
outperformed the S&P 500 index, 47.59% to 16.62%.10 However, it is important to note that the number 
of component companies in these representative ETFs is limited quantitatively and qualitatively. E.g., 
the ISE Cyber Security UCITS Index is comprised of only 33 companies, while the Nasdaq CTA 
Cybersecurity Index is comprised of companies classified as cybersecurity by the Consumer Technology 
Association (CTA). 
 
A broader perspective of the cybersecurity market 
The production of cybersecurity products and services is actually much broader, touching 
multiple industries, from networking, telecommunication and electronic equipment, semiconductors, 
software consulting and production to business support services, financial tech, defense, healthcare and 
insurance. For example, the “Internet of things (IoT)” invokes applications as diverse as consumer 
devices, manufacturing sensors, health monitoring, and connected vehicles. Many of these companies 
are not considered cybersecurity companies per se, yet engage in cybersecurity related activities. 
 




 ETFs in this analysis include: Nasdaq CTA Cybersecurity Total Return Index(INDEXNASDAQ:NQCYBRT), Nasdaq CTA 
Cybersecurity Index(INDEXNASDAQ:NQCYBR), ISE Cyber Security UCITS Net Total Return Index(INDEXNASDAQ:HURNTR), 
PureFunds ISE Cyber Security ETF(NYSEARCA:HACK), First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF(NASDAQ:CIBR), ISE CYBER 
SECURITY GO UCITS ETF(LON:ISPY), ISE CYBER SECURITY GO UCITS ETF(LON:USPY), Direxion Daily Cyber Security & IT 
Bull 2X Shares(NYSEARCA:HAKK). 
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To develop a more representative view of the market, we have initially used Crunchbase11, a technology-
focused database covering multiple industries, to generate a dataset of privately and publicly-held 
companies engaged in cybersecurity activities. Crunchbase includes self-reported and crowd-sourced 
data but has improved in quality in major regions over the past few years and provides global coverage 
(Feldman, 2016; Goujon, 2013). We searched for companies using an evolving list of terms and phrases 
about cybersecurity activities generated from reviewing various cybersecurity professional resources 
and surveys.12 The terms identified can be loosely grouped into network security, information and 
application security, identity management, cyber crime and risk management, cyber policy and 
regulation, etc.  
 
Using this method we identified over 31,000 companies, removing duplicate results left us with around 
15,000 companies. This dataset was screened to remove government agencies, laboratories, 
commissions and most other public organizations, as well as miscategorized companies.13 The dataset 
was validated against several other sources, including:  
● Company lists from various cybersecurity market analyses, e.g., the Cybersecurity 500 (1Q2017) 
identifying market leaders and the Advisen Cybersecurity providers list identifying cyber 
insurance companies.  
● Company lists from various threat information aggregation and sharing services (e.g., 
VirusTotal), CVE Numbering Authorities and vendors identified in the National Vulnerability 
Database. 
● Company member rosters from various cybersecurity coordination bodies, e.g., MAAWG, 
APWG, London Action Plan, ICSG Malware Working Group, etc. 
● Public companies identified in the SEC Edgar database using the same search terms 
 
In some cases we matched nearly all companies in the validation data sources, in others Crunchbase 
searches had missed large numbers of companies. Where we identified companies not found in 
Crunchbase searches, we added companies that had Crunchbase listings. For companies with 
Crunchbase listings we collected information on headquarters location, status (operating, acquired, 
closed) of company, founded and closed dates, number of employees, and funding information. In total, 
we developed a dataset of nearly 14,700 companies. 
  
The distribution of companies by country (listed in part below in Table 2) is extremely skewed, with the 
number of companies based in the United States (7,552 or 60% of the market) almost an order of 
magnitude greater than the next country (United Kingdom). The top 10 countries account for 85% of the 
market. The market is dominated by US-based companies and companies based in allies of the United 




 This included SANS Institute IT Security Spending Trends Report (2016), Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (2016), and 
Center for Internet Security Critical Controls. For a full list of terms used, see Appendix A. 
 
13
 Multiple U.S. government agencies were in Crunchbase, as well as ones from United Kingdom, Australia, and Pakistan. These 
included, but were not limited to research, regulatory, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. We speculate their inclusion in 









































States, with other countries like China, Brazil and Russia accounting for little more than 2.5% of the 
market.  
Table 2: Companies by country (N=12,649) 
Country 
Number of 
companies % of Total 
United States 7522 59.47% 
United Kingdom 892 7.05% 
Canada 488 3.86% 
India 447 3.53% 
Israel 435 3.44% 
Germany 257 2.03% 
France 207 1.64% 
Spain 179 1.42% 
Australia 177 1.40% 
China 156 1.23% 
Ireland 154 1.22% 
Netherlands 140 1.11% 
Switzerland 116 0.92% 
Brazil 110 0.87% 
Sweden 105 0.83% 
Singapore 90 0.71% 
Turkey 59 0.47% 
Russian Federation 54 0.43% 
Japan 54 0.43% 
Italy 52 0.41% 
Finland 52 0.41% 
Norway 51 0.40% 
Belgium 51 0.40% 
Poland 43 0.34% 
Hong Kong 42 0.33% 
Other countries 656 5.65% 










































Table 3 indicates less than 2% of the companies in the market were established prior to 1960. These 
companies are often well known financial, legal, or insurance companies that have only recently entered 
the cybersecurity market. The 1960s and 1970s brought the Computer Inquiries in the United States and 
the beginning of strong growth in the number of cybersecurity producing companies. Since retail 
commercialization of the computer in the early 1980s there has been continued increasing growth in the 
number of companies founded per year with the exception of the Dot Com crash in the early 2000s. 
 




Founded % of Total 
Pre-1960 247 1.92% 
1970s 269 2.09% 
1980s 579 4.50% 
1990s 1906 14.82% 
Post-2000 9861 76.67% 
 
 




As Figure 2 shows, the market grew in parallel with these technological and policy changes, most rapidly 
during the beginnings of the commercial Internet in the mid-1990s and since 2004, with over 91% of 
companies formed during those periods. Europe and Central Asia also experienced similar strong rates 
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of growth compared to North America. However, other regions experienced and continue to experience 
slower rates of growth as well as overall smaller numbers of companies founded.  
 
The relatively stable overall growth of the market is highlighted in the status of companies (Table 4). 
Over 80% remain operating, with over 17% being acquired or having gone public, and only around 2% 
having closed. The relatively low number of public companies highlights another issue for the market 
(and researchers), i.e., the relatively low amount of companies that are required to be transparent. This 
issue is raised around a variety of activities, e.g., vulnerability reporting, anti-virus software 
benchmarking, etc. In some areas, e.g., data breaches, numerous regulations are now in place in certain 
countries providing greater transparency. 
 
Table 4: Companies by status 
Status Companies % of Total 
Closed 311 2.11% 
IPO 466 3.17% 
Operating 11848 80.50% 
Was Acquired 2093 14.22% 
Grand Total 14718 100.00% 
 
The market is characterized by companies with relatively small numbers of employees, with over 70% of 
companies having 100 or fewer employees. This is consistent with anecdotes of information overload in 
the cybersecurity field and highlights the importance of information aggregation and sharing. I.e., there 
are relatively smaller numbers of individuals per company available to manage the amount of 
information required to produce cybersecurity. 
 
















Numerous examples of networked governance structures exist in the cybersecurity field, ranging 









































mitigation collaborations, malware aggregation efforts and standards development organizations 
(SDOs). Employing the terms used in our market research, we identified (Table 6, below) some of the 
networked governance structures helping to produce cybersecurity. 
 
Table 6: Networked governance structures in cybersecurity 
Governance structure 
Time 
period Legal structure Contract Revenue Participating entities 


















Operated by eco – 
Association of the German 
Internet Industry  
No 
 
Dutch Anti-Botnet Working 
Group 
2010- Not formally organized 
 
No ~14 organizations 
IEEE Industry 
Connections Security 
Group (ICSG) Malware 
Working Group 




Conficker Working Group 
2008-
2010 
Not formally organized No No 

















































Private company FrSIRT / 





































































Not formally organized 
   
Trusted Introducer Service 2000- 






PacketStorm 1999- Operated by Kroll-O'Gara  Sales  
3GPP 1998- 
Not formally organized, 






Domain Name System 
Black Lists (DNSBL) 
1997- Not formally organized No No 
~150 list maintainers 
(individuals, 
organizations) 
Internet Routing Registry 
(IRR) 
1994- 
Not formally organized, 





various org types (ISPs, 
RADb, etc.), thousands 
of network operators 





incorporated in 2010, 











Not formally organized No No ~40 individuals 
Advancing Open 










unknown number of 
individuals 
Bugtraq 1993- Operated by Symantec  Sales  
Forum of Incident 




origins in CERT/CC 







Standards Institute (ETSI) 




Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) 
1986- 
Not formally organized, 




affiliated with ~2100 
organizations 
 
There is a long history of networked governance structures in cybersecurity. They exist in numerous 
areas, including standards development (e.g., IETF, ETSI, 3GPP, ATMSO, IEEE, OASIS), sharing of 
vulnerability information (e.g., Bugtraq, WildList, IRR, VirusTotal), and providing research, best practice 
development, or organizational coordination (e.g., DNS-OARC, FIRST, NANOG, APWG, MAAWG). They 
take a wide range of legal forms, from very informal arrangements that have no central coordination, 
e.g., DNS Black Lists or the Internet Routing Registry (IRR), to more centrally controlled groups, e.g., 
501(c)(6) organized trade associations. Several early structures have their origin in or are related to 









































the United States (e.g., FIRST, NANOG, DNS-OARC). More recently, several structures have formed as 
501(c)(6) organizations around specific types of transactional activity like email exchange or anti-virus 
software evaluation (e.g., APWG, MAAWG, AMTSO). Most, but not all structures, have contracts 
governing participating entities. These contracts may be fairly lightweight, e.g., providing 
straightforward terms of service to researchers contributing data. Or they may have more restrictive 
arrangements, e.g., non-disclosure agreements and formal vetting of participants to ensure 
confidentiality. Most structures are, but not always, member fee-based with others supported by 
separate means, e.g., other lines of business. Structures vary widely by number of participating entities, 
ranging from single or small groups of individuals (e.g., Milw0rm, WildList) to large corporations (e.g., 
CyberThreat or Microsoft’s Virus Information Alliance) or large structures incorporating numerous 
individuals affiliated with organizations (e.g., IETF, NANOG), or superstructures of regional and national 
SDOs (e.g., 3GPP, ETSI). 
 
Hierarchies 
As noted previously, hierarchies are a governing structure by which actor(s) transactions are 
compelled by an authority, e.g., enforcement can be achieved by sovereignty and jurisdiction of a 
nation-state(s), by organizational control of the firm or by contractual regime. Examples include national 
laws and regulations or intergovernmental arrangements, and intra-organizational cybersecurity policies 
or transnational contractual regimes based in non-state actors. 
 
National laws and regulations 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to individually survey nation-states cybersecurity laws and 
regulations, instead we aggregate existing works summarizing this activity and provide context. As of 
2014, over thirty countries had developed national cybersecurity strategies (Shackelford and Kastelic, 
2014). According to Shackelford and Kastelic’s (2014, p 18) analysis of national cybersecurity strategies: 
● 56% of governments “discuss information sharing as a key component of managing the cyber 
threat” 
● 44% identify the “necessity of private-sector partnerships, both to share information and to help 
spread cybersecurity best practices” 
● 24% identify “the importance of regulating critical infrastructure organizations to enhance 
cybersecurity” 
● 12% “discussed international partnerships to protect critical infrastructure” 
● 9% note “certification and promoting research and development to better secure critical 
infrastructure” 
 
The Business Software Alliance (BSA) (2015a; 2015b) examined issues noted by Shackelford and  
Kastelic, surveying various governments in the European and Asia-Pacific regions to identify specific 
government activity dealing with: national cybersecurity strategies; critical infrastructure protection and 
information security definitions and plans; systems inventory and data classification; risk management, 
audit and incident reporting procedures; establishment of a CIO/CSO positions; and procurement 









































from the BSA reports supplemented with primary data collected about national cybersecurity policies in 
North America. 
 
Figure 3: National cybersecurity laws, orders, regulations 
 
While the dataset is limited (N=145), it does highlight how cybersecurity policies dealing with the above 
issues impacting governments and their own networks are essentially a phenomena of the past two 
decades corresponding loosely with the growth of the commercial Internet and cybersecurity market. 
Efforts prior to the late 1990s were limited (15 policies, or 10%) focused around topics of data 
classification (e.g., UK’s Official Secrets Act of 1989), the one exception being the 1987 Computer 
Security Act in the United States focused on computer security standards and federal network security 
(one year before the Morris worm). Beginning in 1998, governments would begin to pursue enforceable 
policies in earnest, with a flurry of work in the US between 1998 and 2004 covering the definition, 
identification and protection of critical infrastructure (CIP), standards for federal networks, 
cybersecurity research & development, and creation of DHS. Governments in Europe and Asia Pacific 
would follow suit over the next decade pursuing information security and CIP policies for their own 
networks.  
 
A second, but qualitatively different wave of activity would begin in the US in the mid 2000s. While 
policies reinforcing standards and research support would continue, efforts to improve information 
sharing would become a prominent feature. Policies to improve information sharing actually began 
much earlier with Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), introduced pursuant to PDD-63 
(signed May 22, 1998), that established sector-specific organizations to share information about critical 









































existence for at least ten years.”15 Cybersecurity and national security policy would most clearly 
intersect in 2004 passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, that would create 
the Information Sharing Enterprise (ISE), a collection “people, projects, systems, and agencies that 
enable responsible information sharing across the national security enterprise.” More concretely, the 
ISE would become a member along with USG contractors in a networked governance structure working 
to develop standards for information sharing.16 Ultimately, the USG’s hierarchical efforts to improve 
information sharing would be marginally successful, resulting in the establishment of federally funded 
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations pursuant to Executive Order 13691, and the opportunity 
for voluntary cooperation between the private sector and the government agencies as outlined in the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2015.17 Similar voluntary information sharing was also specified in the EU NIS 
directive. There are many more information sharing laws in various jurisdictions, however they are of a 
voluntary nature, except in South Korea where the Korean Information Security Agency (KISA) mandated 
the ISPs in South Korea to share information among each other and with the government in order to 
defend themselves against DDoS attacks (UK House of Lords Report, 2010). 
 
Intergovernmental organizations, treaties and other initiatives 
There have been many international organizations initiatives that addressed cybersecurity issues 
(see Mauer 2011 for a comprehensive list of these processes). Despite having a multilateral structure 
some organizations claim that they hold multistakeholder processes. ITU telecommunication 
standardization section (ITU-T), which also discusses the cybersecurity aspects of the Internet, asserts 
that it is based on a multistakeholder model. In this paper we do not consider such initiatives as 
multistakeholder initiatives due to the fact that these processes are started by intergovernmental 
organizations and the role of various stakeholder groups in such processes in starting the process is 
minimal. The implementation of the outcome of such processes is also unknown. Moreover, these 
initiatives can be classified as hierarchies but they are not governance structures as such. While they 
have discussed cybersecurity-related norms, they have not been able to operationalize such norms; i.e., 
they have not resulted in binding treaties or even a commitment from the actors to abide by the 
recommendations. One of the many attempts that took place was the ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda 
(GCA). The GCA was launched in 2007 as a framework of international cooperation to promote 
cybersecurity and enhance confidence and security in the information society. This group considered 
many aspects of cybersecurity: legal measures, technical and procedural measures, organizational 
structures, capacity building and international cooperation. It then issued a set of recommendations 
advising ITU and member states how to achieve cybersecurity but with no binding effect. Its 
recommendations were not operationalized. It established the International Multilateral Partnership 
Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) which only provided advice to the member states in case of cyber 
threats. It could be argued that this initiative was the closest that ITU got to operationalizing its 
cybersecurity initiative, but we still have not observed many referrals to IMPACT by various governance 
structures present in the cybersecurity landscape.  

















































Another UN initiative was the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE). Its work 
was more remarkable than other initiatives as it included major state players in the field of 
cybersecurity.18 The UNGGE was convened pursuant to the UN General Assembly resolution 68/243 on 
developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
security and was tasked to carry out a study rules or principles of responsible behavior of States, 
confidence-building measures, international cooperation and assistance in ICT security and capacity-
building and provide comment on how international law applies to the use of ICTs.19 A consensus 
document recommended voluntary measures for confidence and capacity building, including that a 
State should 1) protect and not impair or harm critical Internet infrastructure, 2) not engage with 
international malicious cyber activities and, 3) encourage responsible vulnerability reporting. It also 
noted the international legal principles and obligations that are applicable to the sovereigns are also 
applicable to their ICT related conduct. Importantly, these states agreed that international laws and 
principles apply to States’ cyber actions. However, the report had no binding effect. States have not yet 
committed to a binding convention that recognizes the set of principles and rules suggested by the 
UNGGE and they still lack an international hierarchical governance structure which can operationalize 
these norms and principles.  
 
International agreements and arrangements can sometimes even be disruptive and interfere with other 
governance structures activities. An international arrangement that has an effect on cybersecurity 
information sharing is the Wassenaar Arrangement. Wassenaar is a legally nonbinding and informal 
arrangement which has around 41 participating member states for the export control of goods (Kosseff, 
2017, p 154). While it is nonbinding in nature, some countries including the US have adopted regulations 
that make the arrangement binding. Since 2013, Wassenaar has clauses for export control of software. 
Advocacy groups and cybersecurity companies were opposed to such arrangements because it made the 
cybersecurity information sharing and research more difficult by requiring the cyber researchers to 
receive a license before being able to share information on software vulnerabilities. In 2015, the US 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, nearly adopted rules to make the changes in 
Wassenaar arrangement effective. Security researchers and corporations protested and argued that the 
proposed rules were even more stringent than Wassennaar arrangement and that they would make 
information sharing impossible by requiring researchers and companies to seek for a license every time 
they want to combat a cybersecurity threat (Kosseff, 2017, p 156). 
  
Comparatively more successful international attempts to create governance structures have been within 
the realm of cybercrime and have addressed cybersecurity issues ex post. For example, the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime is regarded as a relatively effective international convention for 
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 The members of UNGGE comprised of: Australia, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Ghana, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Republic of 
Korea, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States of America 
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cybercrime (Hathaway et al. 2012). It is signed and ratified by some of the members and nonmembers of 
the Council of Europe.20 It addresses the issue of prosecution of cybercriminals and revolves around 
illegal interception, data interference and system interference. There are other international and 
regional conventions in place that aim to facilitate the mutual legal assistance and other cooperation in 
combatting cybercrime.21 However, the actual operation and effect of such regional agreements in 
achieving cybersecurity is unknown (Dalla Guarda, 2015). 
 
Other conventions on prosecution of criminals that can be applicable to cybercrime are the European 
Convention on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) such as the European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. MLATs are being increasingly used in prosecution 
of traditional criminals as well as cybercriminals (Swire and Hemmings, 2015). The usage of the Internet 
in communication has led to storing data of legal evidentiary value in various jurisdictions. The 
prevalence of the Internet has led MLATs to be used in criminal investigation and their role has become 
critical in “global law enforcement” (Swire and Hemmings, 2015). The enhanced role of MLATs in 
providing a global law enforcement mechanism is not without its shortcomings. MLAT processes can be 
very time consuming and not efficient for prosecuting cybercriminals or obtaining evidence for 
combatting a cybersecurity attacks and other cybercrime investigations. States sometimes refuse to 
respect MLATs even when they are a party to it. For example, during the cyberattacks that took place 
against Estonia, Estonia started criminal investigations into the attacks and requested Russia to also 
start investigations under Russia-Estonia MLAT. However, Russia refused to assist Estonia under the 
treaty. (Mueller, 2010, p 23) 
 
In summary, there is a lack of well-established international hierarchical governance structures that can 
produce norms and effectuate them. MLATs and other treaties have serious shortcomings. Lack of 
having international legal enforcement instruments might pave the way for states to oppose the 
Internet governance multistakeholder model and also result in more data localization and assertion of 
state sovereignty over cyberspace. (Swire and Hemmings, 2015, p. 6) 
 
Non-state hierarchies  
Private hierarchies can be categorized into firms or multistakeholder organizations. Much work has been 
done to identify the issues and extent of cybersecurity policies being implemented internally by firms, 
although this work is typically survey based.22 Multistakeholder private hierarchies are non-
governmental organizations, or state oversight is minimal in such organizations (or such oversight has 
been removed). Such organizations operate through a variety of processes which entitles non state 
actors to develop governing policies, which are enforced through a contractual regime. Table 7 
                                               
20
 For a list of states that signed and ratified the convention, refer to https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/185/signatures?p_auth=x7A9FPm6 
21
 See UNODC (2013), example agreements include Economic Community of West African States: The Draft Directive on Fighting 
Cybercrime within ECOWAS, ‘African Union Convention on Cyberspace Security and Protection of Personal Data’,‘Arab Convention 
on Combatting Information Technology Offences’ (the LAS Convention), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Agreement on 
Cooperation in Combating Offences related to Computer Information’ (the CIS Agreement), ‘Agreement on Cooperation in the Field 
of International Information Security’  
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summarizes two main multistakeholder private hierarchies impacting cybersecurity. The primary 
example of such organizations is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
which sets policies for the DNS root zone, and enforces those policies through its contracts with top 
level domain registries and registrars. Through these contracts ICANN can, in theory, provide measures 
for combating cybersecurity threats and attacks such as requirements for standards adoption. ICANN 
derives these obligations ostensibly through its multistakeholder policy development process or 
alternatively through the advice of stakeholder groups. The Security and Stability Advisory Committee 
(SSAC) produces reports and advises the ICANN board about various DNS-related security issues which in 
some instances might turn into policy and be enforced through contracts. ICANN also has a coordination 
and disclosure program for vulnerability information. It encourages “any party that has discovered a 
vulnerability that threatens the security, stability, or resiliency of the DNS to give notice to ICANN, who 
will coordinate or facilitate reporting the threat directly and exclusively to the product vendors or 
services providers who the party or ICANN determines are affected by the threat.”23 
 
Table 7: Private hierarchical governance structures 
Governance 
structure Time period  
Legal 












RIPE NCC (1991-) 
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AFRINIC (1,484 members) 
APNIC (6,170 members) 
ARIN (5,493 members) 
LACNIC (5,845 members) 









536 TLD registry operators 




 With a general description of market, networked and hierarchical governance structures in 
hand, this section attempts to draw them together to explain what role each play and how they interact 
to produce and govern cybersecurity. Table 8 (below) highlights some cases concerning network 
security. Cases can be generalized into two types, activity which occurs ex ante to an insecurity or other 
failure occurring (e.g., resource misuse), or ex post as a response to an insecurity. The distinction 
between ex ante and ex post actions is quite important from the NIE perspective (Stephen and 
Gillanders, 1993). Such division provides a clear picture of how the institutional landscape of 
cybersecurity is built. Moreover, it can clarify which governance structures at which stage play a 
stronger role in achieving cybersecurity. Ex ante and ex post division are also important when we 











































consider transaction costs of cybersecurity governance. Such division in TCE has been used when 
analyzing transaction costs with regards to the contractual activities and matters related to supervision 
and enforcement of contracts (Williamson 1985; Furubotn and Richter 2005, p 45). In cybersecurity 
governance, the transaction costs of activities to produce cybersecurity ex ante (in response to an 
insecurity) might differ from the transaction costs of responding to an insecurity ex post. (Garg and 
Camp, 2013) 
 
Table 8: Network security cases 
Type Case Description Governance structure 













Weak demand for 
secure DNS 
resolution 
DNSEXT WG in IETF 
develops DNSSEC 
standards; technical 
community push for 
adoption at ICANN 
USG agencies support 
development of 
DNSSEC; VeriSign, 
ICANN, DoC develop 
root signing process; 















adopt; weak demand 
for ROA validation 
SIDR WG in IETF 
develops RPKI 
standards; ISPs 
routing is distinct 
activity from resource 
allocation 
USG agencies support 
development of RPKI; 
RIRs implement distinct 
root certificate 
authorities, uneven 




















norms to prevent 
network abuse; ISP 
efforts to collectively 
combat botnets 
Based on US law, US 
courts order US-based 
ISPs, Registries, 
Registrars to block 
botnet C&C activity. 







use of network 
resources 
Extensive supply 






ISPs governing BGP; 
Internet Routing 
Registry (IRR)  
USG agencies support 
development of IRR 
(RADb), USG 
EINSTEIN effort to 
monitor internal 
networks; RIPE NCC 
providing BGP 
monitoring tools  
 
When looking at two notable ex ante efforts to secure Internet identifiers, Domain Name Security 
Extensions (DNSSEC) and Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), we see networked and hierarchical 









































private organizations active in its initial development and standardization efforts for several years. The 
actual standardization of DNSSEC took place in the IETF, which we characterized as a networked 
governance structure. This support continued as DNSSEC moved toward adoption, with actors including 
the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, VeriSign and ICANN having key roles in getting DNSSEC implemented at the 
root zone. Ultimately, DNSSEC would also become a contractual requirement on all new generic top 
level domain registry operators. In its registrar accreditation agreement in 2013, ICANN obliged domain 
name registrars to allow their customers to use DNSSEC upon request and accept any public key 
algorithm and digest type that is supported by the TLD of interest.24 As such, it is a rare example of IETF 
RFCs being regulated into adoption rather than being adopted by the market. While most DNS zones are 
DNSSEC signed today, demand for validation of DNSSEC data by ISPs remains relatively low (albeit 
growing).25 A similar story can be told about RPKI, which also benefited from extensive development and 
adoption support from USG agencies. In an interesting twist, however, adoption may be hindered by 
competing hierarchies (the RIRs) implementing individual trust anchors and varying policies governing 
their RPKIs which introduces additional complexity for networks using certain resources26 or operating 
globally. This has possibly led to uneven implementation of Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs).27 
Furthermore, network operators’ demand for validation of ROAs is weak. DNSSEC and RPKI are notable 
for extensive networked and hierarchical structures but the absence of a strong market demand for 
these technologies, the end result being questionable levels of improved cybersecurity.  
 
Botnet mitigation and monitoring of Internet routing represent two ex post network security activities 
showing some of the clearest interaction of market, networked and hierarchy governance structures. 
Botnets are networks of computers infected with malware that are controlled remotely to perform 
potentially malicious activity, such as large-scale denial of service attacks or spam delivery. The 
mitigation of botnets has evolved substantially over the past decade. The market for mitigation services 
to combat botnets typically used in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and other malicious activities, is 
estimated to grow to more than $2B by 2021 from $824M today.28 In addition to significant market 
governance, there are numerous networked governance structures involved. One of the earliest 
publicized efforts relied on an ad-hoc networked governance structure, the Conficker Working Group 
(CWG), which consisted of individuals affiliated with over 30 different organizations. Because the 
Conficker botnet used domain generation algorithms to organize its command and control (C&C) 
infrastructure, the CWG’s effort to dismantle the botnet focused on reverse engineering the algorithms, 
to identify domain names that would be used by the botnet, and pre-registration of domain names. 
Registering names at scale did not pose difficulties from a technical perspective. It did, however, raise 
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 See http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/ddos-protection-mitigation.asp Acording to Markets and Markets, “North 
America is expected to have the largest market share and dominate the DDoS protection market from 2016 to 2021, due to the 
presence of large number of DDoS protection solution vendors and early innovative technology adopters across the U.S. and 
Canada. APAC offers high growth opportunities in the DDoS protection market, as there exists an extensive presence of SMEs that 
are turning towards DDoS protection solutions to proficiently safeguard their business processes, particularly in developing countries 
such as India, China, and Singapore...The major vendors in the DDoS protection market include Arbor Networks, Inc. (U.S.), 
Akamai Technologies, Inc. (U.S.), F5 Networks (U.S.), Imperva, Inc. (U.S.), Radware, Ltd. (Israel), Corero Network Security, Inc. 









































coordination and presumably cost issues with registries (both in the United States and abroad) and 
potential legal issues with registrants of names previously registered. (The Rendon Group, 2010) 
Because of the close cooperation of certain large registries (VeriSign, Neustar and Afilias) and 
coordination facilitated by ICANN with other TLDs (country code operators) the CWG’s approach was 
generally successful in disrupting Conficker’s C&C infrastructure. (pg. 19) ICANN’s hierarchical 
governance of registries also evolved, creating a waiver process in response to the Conficker botnet. This 
process was “for gTLD registries who inform ICANN of a present or imminent security incident 
(hereinafter referred to as "Incident") to their TLD and/or the DNS to request a contractual waiver for 
actions it might take or has taken to mitigate or eliminate an Incident. A contractual waiver is an 
exemption from compliance with a specific provision of the Registry Agreement for the time period 
necessary to respond to the Incident. The Expedited Registry Security Request (ERSR) has been designed 
to allow operational security to be maintained around an Incident while keeping relevant parties (e.g., 
ICANN, other affected providers, etc.) informed as appropriate.”29 
 
Since Conficker, the use of domain generation algorithms to operate botnet C&C infrastructure has 
become prevalent. (Antonakakis, et al. 2012) However, the approaches taken to disrupt botnet 
infrastructure have changed. One approach taken involves legal challenges. As Hiller (2014) explains, 
“multiple civil lawsuits by Microsoft have created the legal precedent for suing botnet operators and 
using existing law to dismantle botnets and decrease their global reach.” From an institutional analysis 
perspective, this strategy has been reliant on the interaction between all three types of governance 
structures. This includes: 1) a dominant operating system vendor in the market that was directly 
impacted by the botnet and had economic incentive to pursue legal action; 2) a relatively small group of 
private actors including DNS registries, registrars and ISP organizations, largely based in the United 
States, with economic and normative incentives to prevent network abuse; and 3) court issued orders 
grounded in relatively few existing US laws30 enforcing those networked organizations to act and block 
the botnet C&C activity. Interestingly, most of these laws existed prior to wave of national cybersecurity 
policy activity noted previously. Together, this combination of governance structures has been used 
repeatedly in at least ten botnet mitigation efforts in the United States since 2010.  
 
But this is not the only approach to handling botnets over the past decade. Anti-botnet initiatives have 
been established in more than half a dozen countries (van Eeten, 2016). Van Eeten et al (2011) detail 
how these initiatives are led by ISPs which, while they are not the source of externalities, have economic 
and normative incentives to ensure their own networks do not propagate botnet activity. The initiatives 
differ from the Microsoft led effort above in some aspects, but seem to share other characteristics. First, 
the initiatives do not target the botnet C&C infrastructure, rather they focus on filtering network traffic 
generated by infected computers. Second, they similarly require a certain level of scale. In their study of 
one Dutch effort, the Anti-Botnet Working Group, the 14 ISPs involved covered 90% of the market 




 In reviewing these cases, it appears that less than 10 US laws are cited across the orders including: CAN-SPAM Act (15 USC § 
7704), Common Law Trespass to Chattels (28 USC § 1367), Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 USC § 1030), Electronic 
Communication Privacy Act (18 USC § 2701), Lanham Act (15 USC § 1114 and § 1125), Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 









































within the Netherlands which made the activity undertaken by the group very effective. (van Eeten et al. 
2011, p 4) Finally, governments have lowered the costs associated with botnet cleanup efforts by 
providing distribution of software tools to clean infected computers (in Japan, Germany) and operation 
of national call centers to assist ISP customers (in Korea, Germany) (van Eeten, 2016, p 55).  
 
Despite the apparent success of both approaches, there appear to be opportunities to further 
institutionalize botnet mitigation. Some organizations implicated in takedowns orchestrated by the 
court orders are not US-based. In those cases, the courts merely requested cooperation from those 
organizations and relied upon normative pressure that they would act accordingly. To date, this appears 
to be sufficient, but it may also present an opportunity to redefine hierarchical governance 
arrangements, e.g., ICANN agreements with non US-based registries or registrars, as an enforcement 
mechanism. The replication in other jurisdictions of similar laws cited in the cases may also be a useful 
hierarchical action to facilitate a more globalized institution. We can already see that countries and 
regions partially follow similar hierarchical frameworks and norm buildings which can help with shaping 
a global cybersecurity governance. For example, there are overlaps between the U.S. NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework and the cybersecurity regulatory framework of the UK, Italy, Japan, South Korea and 
Australia (Shackelford et al. 2015). Similarly, there may be an opportunity for UN-facilitated efforts to 
have an impact on cybersecurity. For instance, efforts to prosecute botnet operators in the United 
States have relied in part on anti-racketeering and corruption law used traditionally against organized 
crime. It has been suggested that the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
which was ratified by the United States in 2005, could be used in a similar capacity to facilitate 
transnational action with regard to cybercrime that can have complex organizational structures. 
(Finklea, 2012) Another area for institutional innovation may surround the distributional outcome. The 
costs to some organizations involved in botnet mitigations can be significant. (Asghari, van Eeten, and 
Bauer, 2015) Obviously, Microsoft’s costs as a plaintiff are likely substantial, but the company’s products 
and customers directly benefit from the action taken. Less obvious are the benefits to and costs borne 
by ISPs, Registries and Registrars in fulfilling the court orders. With more clarity, ways to optimize the 
institution may become apparent and, if agreed upon, make it more sustainable. van Eeten et al. (2011) 
also identify 1) the need for improved data for mitigation, highlighting the transaction costs (for 
example, legal risks) to other organizations (e.g., law enforcement, researchers, financial) in providing 
botnet related information to ISPs, as well as the continuing need for governments to find ways to lower 
cleanup costs and incentivize ISPs and other actors to participate. (van Eeten, 2016 p 58)  
 
Monitoring of Internet routing is also characterized by activity across different types of governance 
structures. What routes ISPs announce using the Border Gateway Protocol (the Internet’s de facto 
routing protocol) are largely dictated by the interconnection agreements they have with other 
providers. These agreements (and the corresponding announcements made) can be quite simple or 
complex depending on the business relationship between providers. Route monitoring is a subset of 
network monitoring and more generally the managed network services and network forensics markets. 









































driven by “the increased need to secure networks from advanced attacks.”31 Network operators have 
utilized network monitoring services for many years. For instance, the US government's EINSTEIN 
program has provided signature based monitoring of its networks since the early 2000s (National 
Research Council, 2014). From an institutional perspective, network operators use of commercial route-
monitoring services to detect unauthorised use of their resources is a private ordering response 
alternative to securing routing ex ante using hierarchically organized technologies like RPKI and 
networked, public good information sharing efforts like the Internet Routing Registry (IRR), which suffers 
from misaligned incentives, high transaction costs, and unmanageable interdependencies. As Kuerbis 
and Mueller (2017, p 74) explain, 
 
What distinguishes these paid services from the IRR is that the operator provides its routing 
policy information directly to the service, in exchange for route monitoring. The operator’s 
routing policy information is compared with observed BGP announcements, and alerts are sent 
when anomalies occur. In other words, the route-monitoring service provider has faultless 
information about an operator’s routing policies. From an economic perspective, they turn the 
functionality of the public, shared good (IRR) into a private good sold to the network operator. 
The fact that the operator is paying for the service strengthens its incentive to provide accurate, 
complete, and up-to-date information about themselves to the service provider. Moreover, an 
operator’s routing policies remain confidential, rather than being published in open databases.  
 
Tellingly, the operators of two large IRRs (Merit and RIPE NCC) are either now offering route monitoring 
to their customers or considering doing so. 
 
A similar evolution in information sharing has occurred in other areas of cybersecurity. Early efforts to 
standardize and share vulnerability information were led by a Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center (FFRDC) operated by the MITRE Corporation under contract with the USG. The 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) database, launched in 1999, is similar to other private, 
hierarchical organized governance structures based on registries. MITRE is the primary CVE Numbering 
Authority (CNA), approves other CNAs that can allocate unique vulnerability identifiers, and adjudicates 
any vulnerability naming disputes.32 Currently, 54 software vendors, third party coordinators, and 
vulnerability researchers are CNAs and can assign and reserve unique identifiers for CVEs. Like the IRR, 
data entered into the CVE database is publicly known and available to anyone, and it also has 
incompleteness and accuracy issues. For instance, in 2016, more than 6,300 publicly disclosed 
vulnerabilities were not included in the database.33 Participation in the CVE database can be seen as a 
classic collective action problem associated with a public good, where its value depends not only upon 
one’s own efforts, but also on the actions of dozens or even hundreds of others, which any individual 
actor cannot predict or control. E.g., actors have varying incentives to contribute information with some 
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 See http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/search.asp?Search=network+monitoring 
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 MITRE’s CVE is different from the other hierarchical governance structures like the RIRs and ICANN in that it doesn’t have policy 












































not wanting to reveal vulnerability information publicly (as evident by reserved CVE identifiers in the 
database with no associated vulnerability information). Numerous alternative vulnerability information 
sharing organizations that take into account actor incentives to exchange data have emerged since the 
CVE database was created. Examples include market-based and market-networked hybrid organizations 
like bug bounty programs operated by vendors or vendor-aggregators HackerOne and BugCrowd, 
subscription-based services like VulnDB or Vupen, and lesser known gray markets like 0day.today.34 
Aside from these efforts that treat vulnerability information as a private good, there are also efforts 
which treat it like a club good, e.g., Microsoft’s Virus Information Alliance or the Cyber Threat Alliance.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper provided a detailed picture of the cybersecurity institutional landscape. Relying on 
the institutional economics concept of governance structures, it surveyed and described market, 
network and hierarchy activity and illustrated in a handful of examples how they interact to govern 
cybersecurity. Our preliminary analysis highlighted several important conclusions. First, ex ante efforts 
to produce cybersecurity using purely hierarchical governance structures, even buttressed with support 
from networked governance structures, struggle without market demand. In contrast, ex post efforts 
like botnet mitigation and route monitoring seem to work under a variety of combinations of 
governance structures. With botnets, all three types of structures appear to be necessary components 
to deal with the problem successfully. Interestingly, our findings of numerous and evolving ex post 
governance structures to mitigate botnets contradicts other work suggesting ex ante sanctions would be 
preferable (Garp and Camp, 2013). This suggests that arguments grounded solely in economic efficiency 
miss other factors at play in dealing with cybersecurity problems. With route monitoring and other 
activities like vulnerability identification that are dependent on information sharing, hierarchical and 
networked structures appear unable to cope with the diversity of actor incentives at work. In their place 
we see the emergence of various market-based and hybrid market-networked organizations. 
Proponents of greater nationalization of cybersecurity generally argue that market participants prefer 
inexpensive and quick solutions over security, and that insecurities created by those participants have 
externalities. One counter-argument is that for certain cybersecurity problems a large part of the market 
is concentrated in a manageable number of actors (van Eeten et al, 201), the implication being 
(allegedly) that regulatory pressure on that smaller number of actors would be sufficient to handle 
externalities. Our observations support the latter perspective and offer more precision by documenting 
the existence of robust market and networked governance structures and a more limited role for 
hierarchical structures. While our conceptual framework and observations offer a useful starting point 
for unpacking how cybersecurity is governed, ultimately we need to understand if and how different 
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